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1 Introduction
Consider a decision maker operating under uncertainty. When can one say that a
new piece of information is more valuable to this agent than another? This question
is in general hard to answer, because the ranking of information value typically
depends upon at least three considerations. (i) The agent’s priors matter. (An
agent who is almost convinced that a serious crisis in the strength of the dollar is
forthcoming may rank the appearance of bad financial news in China or in Europe
very differently than an agent who is less convinced about such a crisis.) (ii) The
preferences and wealth of the agent matter. (For the same prior, two agents with
different degrees of risk aversion may rank in distinct ways a piece of news that almost
eliminates uncertainty about an unlikely financial loss versus a less precise piece of
news about more likely events.) (iii) The decision problem to which information is
applied matters. (The value of being informed about the likelihood of different risks
depends on the availability of insurance markets for these risks.)
The agent possesses some initial prior on a set of payoff-relevant states of na-
ture. An information structure specifies, for every state of nature, a probability
distribution over the agent’s set of signals, so that each signal leads to an update
of the agent’s beliefs on the state of nature. The question we address is when one
information structure provides more information than another.
The first answer to this fundamental question is provided in the seminal work
of Blackwell (1953). According to Blackwell’s ordering, an information structure is
more informative than another whenever the latter is a garbling of the former, i.e.,
when there exists a stochastic matrix –interpreted as noise– such that the matrix of
conditional probabilities of each signal for the less informative structure is obtained
by multiplying the matrix for the more informative structure by the stochastic ma-
trix. Blackwell’s Theorem states that this is the case if and only if a decision maker
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with any utility function would prefer to use the former information structure over
the latter when facing any decision problem. This important result provides a
decision-theoretic foundation for Blackwell’s informativeness ordering. Of course,
the requirement that any decision maker would prefer one information structure to
another is very strong, and most pairs of information structures cannot be com-
pared according to Blackwell’s ordering. In other words, Blackwell’s ordering is very
incomplete.
Following recent developments in the theory of riskiness, we attempt here to
formulate an approach based on decision-theoretic principles in order to complete
Blackwell’s ordering.1 Restricting our attention to a class of no-arbitrage investment
decisions first studied in Arrow (1971a) and to a specific class of ruin-averse utility
functions that like to avoid bankruptcy, we postulate the following informativeness
ordering. Fixing a prior over the states, we say that one information structure is
more informative than another if, over the allowed class of problems and preferences,
whenever the first one is rejected at some price, so is the second. This seems a
plausible minimum desideratum for a notion of informativeness.
Our main result is that this informativeness ordering is complete and is repre-
sented by the decrease in entropy of the agent’s beliefs. 2 Specifically, if one considers
the prior and the collection of posteriors generated by the information structure, we
show that the informativeness of the information structure is represented by the
difference between the entropy of the prior distribution and the expected entropy
of the conditional posterior distributions.3 More precisely, an information structure
uniformly investment dominates another one in our sense if and only if the entropy
1In particular, we follow closely a recent paper by Hart (2010), in which two orderings are
proposed to justify the Aumann and Serrano (2008) index of riskiness and the Foster and Hart
(2009) measure of riskiness.
2Unlike the riskiness papers mentioned in the previous footnote, our decision-theoretic consid-
erations here do not uncover a new index, but provide a new support to the classic concept of
entropy.
3This difference is referred to as “rate of transmission” by Arrow (1971a), who works with a set
of Arrow securities and a logarithmic utility function.
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decrease resulting from the first is larger than that resulting from the second. Our
ordering is complete, since informativeness is characterized by a real number. It
is also compatible with Blackwell’s ordering, since more information according to
Blackwell’s ordering necessarily corresponds to decrease in entropy.
Blackwell showed that there is no ordering of information structures applica-
ble to all decision problems and all possible utility functions. It is thus generally
impossible to unanimously rank all information structures. Our approach aims at
identifying a wide class of utility functions and investment problems where some
version of “unanimity” obtains. More precisely, our approach tells us that in an
economy populated with various agents, differing in their ruin-averse utility func-
tions and in their no-arbitrage investment opportunities, if some agent is willing to
pay more for information structure α than anyone is willing to pay for β, then we say
that α dominates β.4 The characterization of this ordering indicates that entropy
is the only objective way to speak of the informativeness of information structures:
by construction, our ordering is independent both of the agent’s preferences and of
the set of available choices, withing the classes considered. On the other hand, it is
prior-dependent, which may seem to be a limitation. We show, however, that this is
unavoidable, since any ordering based on the same postulate as ours is necessarily
prior-dependent.5 Therefore, in regard to the difficulties described in the first para-
graph, we provide an environment in which our complete informativeness ordering
takes care of considerations (ii) and (iii), although it cannot possibly do the same
with (i).
Section 2 introduces the investment problems that we study, the basic assump-
tions about the investor, and the notions of an information structure and of valuable
information. Section 3 introduces ruin-averse utility functions, no-arbitrage invest-
4We can accomodate agents with heterogeneous wealth if we require the agents to pay not a
price, but a proportion of their wealth.
5There are of course other limitations, e.g., our postulate of an objective prior.
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ment sets, and our informativeness ordering, and then proves the main result. Sec-
tion 4 offers several points of discussion concerning prior independence and wealth
uniformity, presents an axiomatization of our assumptions on preferences and in-
vestment sets, and analyzes several examples. Section 5 is a review of the literature,
and Section 6 concludes. The Appendix provides the proofs.
2 Investments and Uncertainty
We measure the value of information according to its relevance to investment choices.
To this end, we rely on a standard model of investment under uncertainty a` la Arrow
(1971a).6
2.1 The Investor
We consider an agent with initial wealth w, and with an increasing and twice dif-
ferentiable monetary utility function u : R+ → R. The coefficient of relative risk
aversion at wealth z > 0 is:
ρ(z) = −
u′′(z)z
u′(z)
.
We assume that the agent has weakly increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA),
namely, that ρ is nondecreasing on R+. This standard assumption is defended from
the theoretical point of view by Arrow (1971b). It is also consistent with observed
behavior both in the field (Binswanger, 1981; Post, Assem, van den, Baltussen, and
Thaler, 2008) and in laboratory experiments (Holt and Laury, 2002). The class
of IRRA utility functions includes the widely used constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) classes.
We denote by U0 the set of such monetary utility functions. For u ∈ U0, we let
u(0) = limz→0 u(z) ∈ R ∪ {−∞}.
6This basic asset-investment model is used often, e.g., in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green
(1995), Section 19.E, where it is integrated into a general-equilibrium economy.
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Let K be the finite set of states of nature. The investor has a prior belief p with
full support, fixed throughout the paper.7 An investment opportunity or asset is
b ∈ RK , with the interpretation that if b is taken, the agent’s wealth, once uncertainty
is realized, is w + bk in state k. We do not allow for bankruptcy (the possibility of
negative wealth), and say that an asset b is feasible at wealth w when w+ bk ≥ 0 in
every state k ∈ K.8
2.2 The Investments
The investor has the opportunity to choose from an investment set B of assets,
from which he must take one. One possibility among the available choices is to opt
out, namely, to keep his wealth w in a safe asset. We formulate this assumption as
0K ∈ B, where 0K is the null vector of R
K . Thus, an investment set consists of a
subset of RK containing 0K . For instance, the set B can consist of a set of Arrow
securities, or of the asset structure of a complete or incomplete market. Elements
in B can be either divisible (for every b ∈ B, λ ∈ [0, 1], λb ∈ B) or indivisible. We
say that an investment set B is feasible at w when all its elements are feasible at w.
2.3 Information Structures
An information structure α is given by a finite set of signals Sα, together with
transition probabilities αk ∈ ∆(Sα) for every k. When the state of nature is k,
αk(s) is the probability that the signal observed by the agent is s. It is standard
practice to represent any such information structure by a stochastic matrix, with
as many rows as states and as many columns as signals; in the matrix, row k is
the probability distribution (αk(s))s∈Sα. We assume that every signal s has positive
probability under at least one state k. This is without loss of generality, since zero
probability signals can be deleted from the set Sα.
7Except for Subsection 4.1, where we discuss the impossibility of a prior-independent ordering.
8Notice that this is an ex-ante notion of feasibility, which does not take into account the payment
of any amount to purchase information. The dominance relation defined later accounts for this.
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It is useful to think of α in terms of a distribution over posterior probabilities.
Signal s has a total probability pα(s) =
∑
k p(k)αk(s), and the agent’s posterior
probability on K given s is qsα, derived using Bayes’ formula:
qsα(k) =
p(k)αk(s)
pα(s)
.
Information structures are ranked according to the partial Blackwell (1953) order-
ing. A most informative information structure, denoted as α, is one that perfectly
reveals the state of nature k; hence, for any s, there exists a unique k such that
αk(s) > 0. A least informative information structure is any α with no informational
content: (αk(s))s∈Sα is the same distribution for all k.
2.4 Valuable Information
Given a utility function u, initial wealth w, a feasible investment set B, and a
belief q ∈ ∆(K), the maximal expected utility that can be reached by choosing an
investment opportunity b ∈ B is
v(u, w,B, q) = sup
b∈B, b feasible
∑
k
q(k)u(w + bk)
with the convention that 0 · (−∞) = 0.
The ex-ante expected payoff before receiving signal s from α is
pi(α, u, w,B) =
∑
s
pα(s)v(u, w,B, q
s
α).
The possibility of opting out ensures that both v(u, w,B, q) and pi(α, u, w,B) are
always larger than or equal to u(w).
The gain V (α, u, w,B) from investment opportunities in B and information α is
the difference:
V (α, u, w,B) = pi(α, u, w,B)− u(w).
It is often useful for our purposes to rewrite the above expression in this way:
V (α, u, w,B) =
∑
s
pα(s)(v(u, w,B, q
s
α)− u(w)).
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This last expression shows that V (α, u, w,B) > 0 if and only if there exists an s
such that v(u, w,B, qsα) > u(w).
3 Entropy as an Ordering of Information for In-
vestment Problems
3.1 Ruin-Averse Utility and No-Arbitrage Investments
We make two assumptions in our basic framework. One concerns the agent’s utility
function u and the other, the set B of available assets. These two assumptions, taken
together, ensure that the class of utility functions and investment sets are suitable
to rank informativeness.
We call an asset b ∈ Rk belief-supported (given initial belief p) if
∑
k p(k)bk ≤ 0,
and we let B∗ be the set of all belief-supported assets. An investment set B is
belief-supported if it contains only belief-supported assets (B ⊆ B∗), and we let
B∗ be the class of belief-supported investment sets. The belief-supported assets are
characterized by the property that no weakly risk-averse or risk-neutral agent with
belief p would prefer to select such an asset over opting out. We also refer to them
as no-arbitrage assets, as they are also characterized by the absence of arbitrage
opportunities (see, e.g., Duffie, 1996, theorem 1 on page 4 and the later discussion
in section 1.B. of risk-neutral probabilities). For instance, for an investor with a
uniform prior over three states, the asset with payoffs (−7, 2, 3) offers no arbitrage
opportunities ex-ante, but it may be a reasonable investment after acquiring appro-
priate information, e.g., that the true state of nature is not state 1.
We call a monetary utility u ruin-averse whenever u(0) = −∞. Thus, a ruin-
averse agent is one who prefers to opt out rather than making any investment that
leads to ruin with positive probability. Let U∗ ⊂ U0 be the set of all ruin-averse
utility functions in our domain. The next lemma, following the analysis of Hart
(2010), characterizes ruin aversion by means of coefficients of risk aversion.
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Lemma 1 Let u ∈ U0. Then, u ∈ U
∗ if and only if for every z > 0 ρ(z) ≥ 1.
3.2 Information Purchasing
In order to understand the value of information for the agent, we consider a situ-
ation in which the agent has the possibility of purchasing information structure α
before making an investment decision in regard to B. Decisions whether to purchase
information or not are based on the comparison between the expected payoff under
the new information and the sure payoff u(w). The agent with utility function u
and wealth w purchases information α at price µ < w, given an investment set B,
when:
pi(α, u, w − µ,B) ≥ u(w).
Otherwise, the agent rejects information α at price µ.
Our information ordering is defined as follows:
Definition 1 Information structure α uniformly investment-dominates (or investment-
dominates, for short) information structure β whenever, for every wealth w and price
µ < w such that α is rejected by all agents with utility u ∈ U∗ at wealth w for every
opportunity set B ∈ B∗, β is also rejected by all those agents.
The preceding definition seems plausible as a minimum desideratum in order to
speak of informativeness. The next lemma identifies the important role played in
the definition by an agent with a logarithmic utility function:
Lemma 2 Given an information structure α, a price µ, and a wealth level w > µ, α
is rejected by all agents with utility u ∈ U∗ at wealth level w given every opportunity
set B ∈ B∗ if and only if α is rejected by an agent with ln utility at wealth w for the
opportunity set B∗.
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3.3 Entropy Ordering
With the assumptions made about assets and utility functions, our next step is to
arrive at a representation of the ordering just defined. In effect, achieving this repre-
sentation will provide an index of informativeness for information structures, i.e., an
objective way to talk about an information structure being more informative than
another, based on the investment framework described. The result below character-
izes entropy as such an index, which is independent of the specific utility function of
the decision maker, of his wealth, and of the specific investment decision considered.
In contrast, such an index cannot be independent of the decision maker’s prior, as
we also show in the next section.
Following Shannon (1948), the entropy of a probability distribution q ∈ ∆(K) is
the quantity:
H(q) = −
∑
k∈K
q(k) log2 q(k),
where 0 log2(0) = 0 by continuity.
9 The entropy of p is a measure of the level
of uncertainty about the state of nature held by the investor with belief p. The
entropy is always nonnegative, and is equal to zero only in the case of certainty,
i.e., when q puts weight 1 on some state k. It is concave, representing the fact that
distributions that are closer to the extreme points in ∆(K) correspond to a lower
level of uncertainty. On the other hand, entropy achieves its global maximum at the
uniform distribution, a situation of “maximal uncertainty.”
Recall that following information structure α, (i) the agent’s signal is s with
probability pα(s); and (ii) the posterior probability on K following s is q
s
α. The
entropy informativeness of information structure α is the expected reduction of
9The specific function log
2
(·) stems from the normalization that the amount of information
carried by the observation of a Bernoulli random variable with parameter 1/2 is exactly one bit.
For us, any log function would work, including, for example, ln(·).
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entropy of the investor’s beliefs due to his observation of s. It is this quantity:
I(α) = H(p)−
∑
s
pα(s)H(q
s
α).
As shown in Subsection 4.1, I(α) depends on p as well as on α. (For notational
simplicity, we do not include p as an argument of I. Only in Subsection 4.1 do we
make this dependence explicit.) The informativeness is minimal when α is α with
no informational content, and I(α) = 0. It is maximal when α is α that fully reveals
the state of nature k, and value I(α) = H(p). Note that given a prior p, I is a
numeric index, which hence defines a complete ordering of information structures.
3.4 Main Result
Our main result establishes that the ordering of information structures given by
investment dominance coincides with the ordering according to entropy informa-
tiveness. Hence this ordering is complete.
Theorem 1 Information structure α investment-dominates information structure
β if and only if I(α) ≥ I(β).
The proof of this result hinges on two crucial steps. First, we establish that an
agent with logarithmic utility values information about our class of investments using
entropy. Then, since by Lemma 2 all agents in the class U∗ reject an information
structure α at a price if and only if so does the logarithmic utility, entropy must
order information structures in our investment-domination sense for all agents in U∗.
Notice that although the proof in Lemma 2 borrows from the techniques in Hart
(2010), we establish an important additional step, namely, that the logarithmic
agent, the universally less risk-averse agent in our class, is also the one who is the
most willing to pay for information.
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4 Discussion
This section discusses each of the assumptions used in our approach.
4.1 Prior-Independent Ordering
For a given prior p, the informativeness ordering we have suggested is represented by
a decrease in entropy. Making the dependence of I(α) on p explicit, we denote here
I(α) by I(α, p). An information structure α is more informative than another β,
I(α, p) ≥ I(β, p), if and only if α causes a larger reduction in entropy (from the
entropy of the prior p to the expected entropy of the generated posteriors) than
does β.
We now prove that there can be no index that orders information structures
that is both compatible with uniform investment dominance and independent of the
agent’s prior. In order to do this, let us define the following.
Definition 2 An information structure α investment-dominates independently of
the prior β, whenever α investment-dominates β for all priors p.
This definition turns out to be too strong a requirement, and leads to the fol-
lowing impossibility result:
Theorem 2 There exists no numerical representation that orders information struc-
tures according to the ordering of investment dominance independently of the prior.
4.2 Uniformity in Wealth
After the discussion opened in the previous subsection, we now return to fixing a
prior p, which will remain fixed for the rest of the paper.
We have defined information dominance as wealth-independent, but this is not
really a restriction. To see this, consider the following alternative definition:
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Definition 3 Information structure α investment-dominates information structure
β for wealth w if, for every price µ < w such that α is rejected by all agents with
utility u ∈ U∗ for every opportunity set B ∈ B∗, β is also rejected by all those agents.
This definition leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 3 Information structure α investment-dominates information structure
β for wealth w if and only if I(α) ≥ I(β).
The result clearly follows because Lemma 2 holds for either Definition 2 or Def-
inition 3 and the ordering I(·) induced by logarithmic preferences is independent of
wealth.
In a similar vein, we have made so far comparisons for agents with the same
level of wealth. This can be avoided provided the pricing is done as a proportion of
wealth.
Definition 4 Information structure α proportionally investment-dominates infor-
mation structure β if, for any 0 < λ < 1, whenever α is rejected by all agents with
utility u ∈ U∗ for every opportunity set B ∈ B∗ at every wealth w for price λw, β is
also rejected by all those agents.
Before getting to the next result, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3 Let 0 < λ < 1. An information structure α is rejected by all agents with
utility u ∈ U∗ for every opportunity set B ∈ B∗ at every wealth w for the price λw
if and only if α is rejected by an agent with ln utility at every wealth level for the
opportunity set B∗.
Using Lemma 3 we show:
Theorem 4 Information structure α proportionally investment-dominates infor-
mation structure β if and only if I(α) ≥ I(β).
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4.3 On the Ruin-Aversion and No-Arbitrage Assumptions
This subsection is intended to shed additional light on the role of the ruin-averse
utility functions – the class U∗ – and the class of no-arbitrage or belief-supported
investment sets – B∗. So far, the assumptions underlying our main result, theorem 1,
were that (1) the decision makers we study strongly dislike situations in which their
wealth approaches zero (ruin aversion), and (2) the investments they consider do
not offer profitable opportunities in the absence of new additional information (no
arbitrage). Now we offer a joint axiomatization of such economic circumstances, i.e.,
of such preference-investment pairs.
Thus, consider in general any class of utility functions included in our original
IRRA class U0 and any class B of feasible investment sets. First, it is worthwhile
to point out that the classes U∗ of ruin-averse functions and B∗ of no-arbitrage sets
jointly have two properties that we now turn to discuss.
The first property is No Investment under No Information, or NINI for short.
According to this property, in the absence of information beyond the prior p, the
agent prefers to opt out rather than to invest in risky elements of B. As stated,
it is a joint assumption on the possible investment set B and the agent’s utility
function u. It can be viewed as a normalization: for a decision maker who is con-
sidering improving his information before investing, we define his initial position as
“not being ready to invest” if he gets no new information.
The NINI property expresses the idea that B is such that V is null unless α has
some informational content; more precisely:
NINI: B is the class of investment sets B such that for
V (α, u, w,B) = 0 for every u ∈ U0, w ∈ R+.
To motivate the second property, we now discuss the circumstances under which
information is valuable to the agent. First, note that if B does not contain feasible
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elements b such that bk > 0 in some state k, the agent always weakly prefers to opt
out. More generally, an agent who fully learns that k is the state of nature cannot
take advantage of such information, unless there exists a feasible b offering a gain in
state k. We say that an investment set B is investment-prone if, for every k ∈ K,
there exists b ∈ B such that bk > 0.
What quality of information is needed to ensure that every investor takes advan-
tage of investment-prone sets? We say that information structure α is sometimes
certain if qsα(k) = 1 for some k and s, that is, when there is a signal s which, if
received, reveals that the state of nature is k for sure. If α is not sometimes certain,
we call it always uncertain.
The next lemma shows that sometimes-certain information structures are always
advantageous, provided B is feasible and investment-prone.
Lemma 4 If B is investment-prone and feasible at wealth level w, then V (u, w, α, B) >
0 for every α that is sometimes certain and for every u ∈ U0.
The second joint property of utility functions and investment sets is that only
investors with access to sometimes-certain information structures are always inclined
to invest. This property, (SCAI for short) is expressed as
SCAI: U consists of the elements u of U0 satisfying the condition that there exists a
wealth level w and an investment-prone set B of feasible investment opportu-
nities such that V (α, u, w,B) = 0 for every always-uncertain α.
According to SCAI, whenever α is always uncertain, then there exists a feasible
and investment-prone set of investment opportunities such that the agent weakly
prefers to opt out. The idea is that not every piece of information is always valuable,
i.e., valuable for every agent in every circumstance. In particular, risk-averse agents,
like ours, may not use investment opportunities with a positive expected profit if the
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associated risk is too high. On the other hand, our agents surely can take advantage
of being fully informed. The SCAI property establishes a restriction on the class
of agents, requiring that only sometimes-certain information structures be always
valuable to them.
As noted above, both the classes U∗ of ruin-averse utility functions and B∗ of
no-arbitrage investment sets satisfy NINI and SCAI. That they satisfy NINI is clear:
no-arbitrage assets offer no profitable investment opportunity to risk-averse agents
if there is no new information. To see that they also satisfy SCAI, think of a typical
investment-prone asset with large negative payoffs in all states but one; with such
no-arbitrage assets around, a risk-averse investor will want to opt out unless the
new information completely reveals one state. Taken together, NINI and SCAI
therefore depict situations in which a risk-averse investor is cautious in utilizing new
information, given that the available investments out there may include very risky
deals.
What is perhaps more surprising is that these two properties uniquely define a
set U of utility functions and a class B of investment sets, and that both U = U∗
and B = B∗:
Theorem 5 U and B satisfy NINI and SCAI if and only if U is the class U∗ of
ruin-averse utility functions, and B is the class B∗ of no-arbitrage investment sets.
4.4 Examples
We now compute some examples. The first one illustrates how our framework serves
to complete Blackwell’s ordering.
Example 1 Let K = {1, 2, 3} and fix a uniform prior. Consider two information
structures that are not ordered in the Blackwell sense. For instance, let each of the
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two information structures have two signals:
α1 =

1 01 0
0 1

 , α2 =

 1 00.1 0.9
0 1


To see that they are not ranked according to Blackwell, we exhibit two decision
problems where a decision maker would rank them differently. For instance, in Prob-
lem 1 the agent must choose one of two actions: action 1 gives a utility of 1 only in
the first two states, and 0 otherwise, while action 2 gives a utility of 1 only in the
third state, and 0 otherwise. Problem 2, in contrast, has action 1 pay a utility of
1 only in the first state, and 0 otherwise, while action 2 gives a utility of 1 only in
states 2 or 3, and 0 otherwise. Facing Problem 1, the decision maker would value
α1 more than α2: following the first signal in α1, he would choose the first action
and following the second signal in α1, he would choose the second action, thereby
securing a utility of 1. This would be strictly greater than his utility after α2. On
the other hand, facing Problem 2, he would under α2 choose action 1 after the first
signal and action 2 after the second, yielding a utility of 29/30, which is greater than
his optimal utility after α1.
But by calculating their entropy reduction from the uniform prior, we know that
I(α1) > I(α2). Thus, for every investment problem we consider and every utility
function in our allowable class, the first information structure is more valuable –more
informative– than the second when starting from a uniform prior. The difficulty in
the two problems of this example is that, if one specifies an economic environment
like ours to make sense of the action-utility pairs provided, the resulting investment
set fails to be belief-supported, for at least some wealth levels.
The second example illustrates the optimization over investment sets.
Example 2 Let the prior belief p and the investment opportunity bi be such that for
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a unit of investment the return is:
bik =
{ 1
p(k)
− 1 if k = i
−1 if k 6= i
.
Then, one can easily see that
K∑
k=1
p(k)bik = 0
and hence, bi is belief-supported given initial belief p. Suppose that B is composed
of a set of K perfectly scalable investment opportunities b1 through bK, one for each
state of nature. Then, suppose wi is the amount an investor invests in b
i. This
implies that:
v(ln, w, B, q) = sup
b∈B, b feasible
K∑
k=1
q(k) ln
(
wk
p (k)
)
so that the optimal w∗k is equal to q(k)w. Hence,
v(ln, w, B, q) =
K∑
k=1
q(k) ln
(
q (k)
p (k)
)
+ lnw.
For other CRRA utility functions with parameter φ we can write,
v(φ, w,B, q) = sup
b∈B, b feasible
K∑
k=1
q(k)
1− φ
(
wk
p (k)
)1−φ
so that the optimal w∗k can be expressed as:
w∗k = λq(k)
1/φp (k)−(1−φ)/φ w
with λ = 1/
∑K
k=1
(
q(k)1/φp (k)−(1−φ)/φ
)
. Hence,
v(φ, w,B, q) =
K∑
k=1
q(k)
1− φ
(
q (k)
p (k)
λw
)1−φ
φ
.
The next example illustrates how entropy ranks lotteries over two information
structures compared to an “expected information structure” which combines the two
outcomes of the lottery.
Example 3 Assume a prior p of K equiprobable states. Then
H (p) = −
K∑
k=1
1
K
log2(K) = − log2(K).
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Consider the following information structure:
α1 =

 1 00.5 0.5
0 1

 .
Given the uniform prior, each signal is equally likely. The corresponding poste-
riors are (2/3, 1/3, 0) and (0, 1/3, 2/3). The expected entropy of the posteriors is
−(2/3) ln 2+ln 3
ln 2
, which is approximately 0.9182.
On the other hand, consider a situation in which the agent is offered two infor-
mation structures α1 and α2, each with one-half probability, as follows:
α1 =

1 01 0
0 1

 , α2 =

1 00 1
0 1

 .
Note how the “average” of these two information structures is the original informa-
tion structure α.
In α1, the first signal has a probability of 2/3 and the second signal has a probabil-
ity of 1/3. The corresponding posteriors are (1/2, 1/2, 0) and (0, 0, 1). Following α2,
the probability of the first signal is 1/3 and that of the second is 2/3; the correspond-
ing posteriors are (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1/2, 1/2). The corresponding expected entropy is
(2/3) ln 2
ln 2
, which is 2/3.
Thus, the experiment consisting of purchasing the lottery of the two informa-
tion structures is more informative than its expected information structure. More
generally, this follows from the convexity of the − log2 function.
Finally, although we have worked with finitely many states to avoid measure-
theoretic technicalities, the results in this paper are easy to extend to distributions
with a continuum of states. This is useful because many applications assume such
a continuum.
Example 4 The normal distribution has a particularly simple entropy. Suppose s
is an n × 1 vector of normally distributed variables, where s ∼ N (µ,Σ) . Then, if
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we let |Σ| be the determinant of the variance-covariance matrix, we find that:
H (s) = −
1
2
log2 ((2pie)
n |Σ|) .
When s follows a univariate uniform distribution in the interval [A,B], then
H(s) can be written as:
H (s) = −
∫ B
A
1
B − A
log2
(
1
B − A
)
du = log2 (B −A) .
It is clear that information structures can be ordered by the expected reduction
on |Σ| in the first case and by the expected reduction of B − A in the second.
5 Related Literature
Other authors have justified the use of the entropy index based on information
theoretic considerations, and have showed that it arises naturally in a variety of
dynamic setups. A salient feature of our work is that it shows that entropy is also
rooted in economic and decision-theoretic arguments in static setups.
Shannon (1948), who introduced entropy as a measure of information, charac-
terizes it as the only measure that jointly satisfies these three properties: continuity,
monotonicity, and decomposability. Marschak (1959) presents formal arguments in
favor of using entropy in the study of the demand for information and its cost. Af-
ter these classic contributions, the concept has arisen separately in several fields of
economics, and we provide only a brief partial survey here.
Gossner, Herna´ndez, and Neyman (2006) study repeated games in which one of
the players, who can forecast the realization of future states of nature, can transmit
information to others through his choice of actions. They provide a closed-form
characterization, based on entropy, of the set of distributions which the players can
achieve.
Gossner and Tomala (2006) analyze games in which a team of players uses pri-
vate signals in a repeated game to secretly coordinate their actions. They show
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that entropy is an adequate measure of informativeness to study the trade-off be-
tween the generation of signals for future coordination and the use of acquired secret
information.
The Theil coefficient for economic inequality is based on the entropy of observed
data. Bourguignon (1979) axiomatizes this measure by showing that it is the only
one that is consistent with a property of income-weighted decomposability.
In Sims (2003)’s model of rational inattention, entropy is used to measure in-
formation acquisition by agents with bounded information-processing capabilities.
This approach has been applied to different economic problems. For instance, Peng
(2005) explores its implications for asset-price dynamics and consumption behavior.
Sims (2005) offers a summary of other contributions in this area.
Arrow (1971a) considers an investor who has access to a set of securities that
pay a positive amount in only one state of nature. He shows that, if the value of
information about the state is independent of the returns, then this value is given
by the entropy of this information.
Entropy is also the basis for the relative-entropy measure of proximity of prob-
ability distributions. Blume and Easley (1992) and Sandroni (2000) show that in
dynamic exchange economies, markets favor agents who make the most accurate
predictions when accuracy is measured according to relative entropy. Other appli-
cations of relative entropy include ambiguity aversion (Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Rustichini, 2006) and reputation models (Gossner, 2011).
Measuring the amount of information is a common problem in economics and
decision theory.10 Most of the work in this area follows the seminal work of Black-
well (1953). For Blackwell, an information structure α is more informative than
an information structure β if every decision maker prefers α to β in any decision
problem. As noted in the introduction, the main drawback of this approach is that
10Veldkamp (2011) provides a good summary of ways in which economists have measured infor-
mativeness and its applications.
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this criterion does not provide a complete ordering. Researchers have made progress
by focusing on decision makers who have preferences in a particular class. Lehmann
(1988), for instance, restricts the analysis to problems that generate monotone deci-
sion rules (and hence satisfy single-crossing conditions). Persico (2000), Levin and
Athey (2001), and Jewitt (2007) extend Lehmann’s analysis to more general classes
of monotone problems. We follow this tradition with two main differences. First,
unlike the measures in those papers, our measure of informativeness provides a com-
plete order of all information structures. Second, we achieve this through a different
kind of restriction on admissible preference orderings, and we characterize decision
problems in terms of investment opportunities, thereby restricting the framework.
Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) and Azrieli and Lehrer (2008) take an approach that
differs markedly with respect to the one used in papers cited in the previous para-
graphs. Rather than choosing a class of decision problems, and then providing an
ordering of information structures, they characterize the orderings that are possible
for any prespecified class of decision problems. The 1991 paper considers determin-
istic information structures, and the 2008 paper extends the analysis to stochastic
ones. The entropy function satisfies the axioms of the first paper, and hence it is a
“value of information” function over partitions of the set of states. The 2008 paper
shows that reducibility, weak order, independence, continuity, and convexity char-
acterize all binary relations on information structures induced by decision problems,
entropy being one of them.
A recent paper by Ganuza and Penalva (2010) provides a different way to order
information structures (also a partial order) which is based not on decision-theoretic
considerations, but rather on various measures of dispersion of distributions. (Many
of those measures are presented in Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007). They show
that while some of their measures are implied by notions of informativeness based on
the value of information, the strongest of their criteria, supermodular precision, is
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strictly different: it neither implies nor is implied by those notions of informativeness.
They then proceed to study the implications of greater informativeness (in their
sense) for auction problems, and show that while greater informativeness improves
allocational efficiency, the auction organizers are not always interested in increasing
informativeness since that may increase the buyers’ informational rents.
6 Conclusion
In the classic framework of information structures proposed by Blackwell, we have
found that, for a given prior, a natural informativeness ordering (namely, that if a
decision maker is willing to pay a price for an informative information structure, he
is willing to pay that price for a one that dominates it) is complete when considered
over the class of ruin-averse utility functions and no-arbitrage investment sets. Fur-
thermore, this ordering is represented by the expected decrease of entropy from the
prior to the posteriors, and this ordering is complete. We have also found that no
such ordering can be made independent of the decision maker’s prior.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We follow Hart (2010). Assume that for every z > 0,
ρ(z) = −
u′′(z)
u′(z)
z ≥ 1.
By integrating between z < 1 and 1 we obtain,
ln u′(z)− ln u′(0) ≥ − ln(z),
which can be rewritten as:
u′(z) ≥
u′(0)
z
.
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A second integration between z < 1 and 1 shows that
u(z)− u(1) ≤ u′(0) ln(z),
and hence that u(0) = limz→0 u(z) = −∞.
Now assume that there exists z0 > 0 where ρ(z0) < 1. Since u is IRRA, then for
every z ≤ z0, ρ(z) ≤ ρ(z0) < 1. Integrating shows that for every z ≤ z0,
ln u′(z)− ln u′(z0) ≤ −ρ(z0)(ln(z)− ln(z0)),
which can be expressed as
u′(z) ≤ u′(z0)
(
z
z0
)−ρ(z0)
.
A second integration between z < z0 and z0 shows:
u(z)− u(z0) ≥
z0u
′(z0)
1− ρ(z0)
((
z
z0
)1−ρ(z0)
− 1
)
.
Since 1 − ρ(z0) > 0, the limits of the right-hand side, and hence of the left-hand
side, are finite. This shows that u(0) > −∞.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
First, note that the only if condition is satisfied since the ln utility function belongs
to B∗ and B∗ ∈ B∗.
We now prove the if part. Assume that α is rejected at price µ given the
investment set B∗ by an agent with ln utility and with wealth w. For u ∈∗, Lemma
1 shows that ρ(z) ≥ 1 for z > 0; hence:
u′′(z)
u′(z)
≤ −
1
z
.
By integration between w and z:
{
ln u′(z)− ln u′(w) ≤ − ln(z) + ln(w) if z ≥ w;
ln u′(z)− ln u′(w) ≥ − ln(z) + ln(w) if z ≤ w.
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Once w is fixed, a second integration with respect to z between w and z′ shows that
for every z′,
u(z′)− u(w) ≤ wu′(w)(ln(z′)− ln(w)).
Hence, given any belief q, B ∈ R∗ and µ < w, we can write:
v(u, w − µ,B, q)− u(w) ≤ wu′(w)(v(ln, w − µ,B, q)− ln(w));
and by summation over qα, for every B ∈
∗ and µ < w, we obtain:
pi(α, u, w − µ,B)− u(w) ≤ u′(w)w(pi(α, ln, w − µ,B)− ln(w)).
Since pi(α, u, w−µ,B) is nondecreasing in B, and B∗ is the maximal element of B∗,
then for every B ∈ B∗ and µ < w we have:
pi(α, u, w − µ,B)− u(w) ≤ wu′(w)(pi(α, ln, w − µ,B∗)− ln(w)) < 0,
which is the desired conclusion.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 2 shows that α uniformly investment-dominates β if and only if, for every
w and µ < w, an agent with ln (or, equivalently, log2) utility function who rejects
α for the opportunity set B∗ also rejects β. The following lemma characterizes the
value of information for an agent with log2 utility function and opportunity set B
∗.
Lemma A.1 For every w > 0 and belief q,
1.
v(log2, w, B
∗, q) = log2(w)−H(q)−
∑
k
q(k) log2 p(k).
2.
pi(α, log2, w, B
∗) = I(α) + log2(w).
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Proof. For the first point, v(log2, w, B
∗, q) is the maximum of
∑
k q(k) log2(w+ bk)
over (bk) such that
∑
k p(k)bk ≤ 0. The first-order condition shows that w + bk is
proportional to qk
pk
, and hence equal to w qk
pk
. We then obtain:
v(log2, w, B
∗, q) = log2(w) +
∑
k
q(k) log2 q(k)−
∑
k
q(k) log2 p(k)
= log2(w)−H(q)−
∑
k
q(k) log2 p(k).
For the second point, we rely on the previous expression to deduce:
pi(α, log2, w, B
∗) =
∑
s
pα(s)v(log2, w, B
∗, qα(s))
= log2(w)−
∑
s
pα(s)H(q
s
α)−
∑
k,s
pα(s)q
s
α(k) log2 p(k)
= I(α) + log2(w)
since
∑
s pα(s)q
s
α(k) = p(k).
We now complete the proof of Theorem 1. Recall that by Lemma A.1, an agent
with utility function log2 rejects α at price µ < w for the opportunity set B
∗ if and
only if:
I(α) < log2
(
w
w − µ
)
.
If I(α) ≥ I(β), then β is rejected whenever α is. If, on the contrary, I(α) < I(β),
let µ be such that:
I(α) < log2
(
w
w − µ
)
< I(β).
At this price µ, α is rejected whereas β is accepted. Hence, α does not investment-
dominate β.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2
By Theorem 1 and a fixed prior p, the only possible index is I(α, p) = H(p) −∑
s pα(s)H(q
s
α). Therefore, it suffices to construct an example to show that this
index orders two information structures in different ways for two different priors.
The example follows.
29
Let K = {1, 2, 3}. Let p1 = (1/2, 1/2, 0) and p2 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) and an agent
with u(x) = ln(x).11
Let information structures α1 and α2 be described by these two-signal three-state
matrices:
α1 =

 1 00 1
0.5 0.5

 , α2 =

0.3 0.70 1
1 0

 .
Clearly, the expected utility for the agent with logarithmic utility under α1 is
larger than that for α2 when priors are p1 as the former gives her full information
while the latter does not. It thus follows that:
I(α1, p1) = H(p1)−
∑
s
pα1(s)H(q
s
α1) > H(p1)−
∑
s
pα2(s)H(q
s
α2) = I(α2, p1).
What is the expected entropy of the posteriors generated by α1 and α2 under
p2? First, the utility for a ln agent of prior p2 is ln(1/3). Then for α1 the expected
utility is: (
2
3
)
ln
(
2
3
)
+
(
1
3
)
ln
(
1
3
)
= −0.63651.
Therefore,
H(p2)−
∑
s
pα1(s)H(q
s
α1
) =
(2/3) ln 2
ln 2
=
0.462 10
ln 2
= 2/3.
As for α2, the (conditional on p2) probability of either signal is 13/30 and 17/30.
After she observes each signal, her posteriors are (3/13, 0, 10/13) and (7/17, 10/17, 0),
respectively. Thus, her expected ln utility from α2 is:
(
13
30
)((
3
13
)
ln
(
3
13
)
+
(
10
13
)
ln
(
10
13
))
+
(
17
30
)((
7
17
)
ln
(
7
17
)
+
(
10
17
)
ln
(
10
17
))
= −0.618 .
11We make our computations below on the basis of this utility function, but recall that for all
x, log
2
x = lnx/ ln 2, a positive transformation.
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Noting that ln(1/3) is the expected utility from the prior, we can derive:
H(p2)−
∑
s
pα2(s)H(q
s
α2) =
0.480 61
ln 2
.
That is,
I(α1, p2) = H(p2)−
∑
s
pα1(s)H(q
s
α1
) < H(p2)−
∑
s
pα2(s)H(q
s
α2
) = I(α2, p2).
Hence, whereas for prior p1 information structure α1 is more informative than
α2, the opposite is true for prior p2.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3 and Theorem 4
For a fixed w, it follows from Lemma 2 that α is rejected by all agents with utility
u ∈ U∗ at wealth w and price λµ if and only if it is rejected by an agent with ln utility
for the opportunity set B∗ at the same wealth level and price. Hence Lemma 3.
Note that the property that an agent with ln utility purchases some information
at price λw for wealth level w is independent of w.
From Lemma 3, α proportionally investment dominates β if and only if, for every
λ, whenever an agent with utility ln and opportunity set B∗ purchases β at some
wealth level w for the price λw, the same agent purchases α. This is equivalent to
the fact that given some w > 0 and for every µ, whenever an agent with utility
ln and opportunity set B∗ purchases β at wealth level w for the price µ, the same
agent purchases α. From point 2 of Lemma A.1, this statement is equivalent to
I(α) ≥ I(β). Hence Theorem 4.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 4
Let k, s be such that qsα(k) = 1, and let b ∈ B be such that bk > 0. If bk is feasible,
then we have v(u, w,B, qsα) ≥ u(w + bk) > u(w). Hence,
V (α, u, w,B) ≥ pα(s)(u(w + bk)− u(w)) > 0.
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A.7 Proof of Theorem 5
Given a class U ⊆ U0 of utility functions, we say that an investment b individually
satisfies NINI if for every u ∈ U and w ∈ R+ such that b is feasible,
∑
k
p(k)u(w + bk) ≤ u(w).
Thus, b individually satisfies NINI when, under no information, the agent does not
prefer b to opting out. We denote as B˜ the set of investments that individually
satisfy the NINI property. Since 0K satisfies NINI, the NINI investment set is a
nonempty investment set.
Lemma A.2 Given U , B satisfies NINI if and only if B is the class of investment
sets contained in B˜.
Proof. B satisfies NINI if and only if it contains all the investment sets B such that
for every w > 0 and u ∈ U ,
V (α, u, w,B) = 0.
That is, if B is such that for every w > 0, u ∈ U , it is true that
sup
b∈B, b feasible
∑
k
p(k)u(w + bk) = 0.
An equivalent way to write the previous statement is: for every w > 0, u ∈ U and
b ∈ B feasible, then we have:
∑
k
p(k)u(w + bk) ≤ u(w),
which is finally equivalent to B ⊆ B˜.
Therefore, we assume from this point on that B˜ is the NINI investment set
corresponding to a set of utility functions U , and that B is the class of investment
sets contained in B˜.
We say that a set A ⊆ RK is comprehensive if, for every feasible b′ and for every
feasible b ∈ A such that b′k ≤ bk for every k, we also have b
′ ∈ A.
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Lemma A.3 B˜ is comprehensive.
Proof. Assume that b ∈ B˜ and that b′ is such that b′k ≤ bk for every k. Then, b is
feasible at wealth w whenever b′ is; and for every u ∈ U , w ∈ R+,
∑
k
p(k)u(w + b′k) ≤
∑
k
p(k)u(w + bk) ≤ u(w).
Hence, b′ ∈ B˜.
We observe that if B˜ is not investment-prone, neither is any element of B, a
subset of B˜. In this case, SCAI becomes trivially equivalent to U = ∅. In contrast,
the following proposition characterizes SCAI when B˜ is investment-prone.
Proposition A.4 If B˜ is investment-prone, then U satisfies SCAI if and only if
U = U∗.
Proof. We divide the proof into a series of lemmata.
Lemma A.5 Let u ∈ U0. If u(0) > −∞, then for every w and for every B that is
investment-prone and feasible, there exists an always-uncertain α such that
V (u, w, α, B) > 0.
Proof. Fix u, w, and the set B that is investment-prone and feasible.
For 1 > ε > 0, let αε be defined by Sαε = K, α
ε
k(s) = 1 − ε if k = s, and
αk(s) =
ε
K−1
otherwise. It can easily be werified that αε is always uncertain for
every ε > 0, and that as ε→ 0, qkαε(k)→ 1 for every s.
Since B is investment-prone, there exist k∗ and b∗ ∈ B such that b∗k∗ > 0. We
now have
v(u, w,B, qk
∗
αε) = sup
b∈B
∑
k
qk
∗
αε(k)u(w + bk)
≥
∑
k
qk
∗
αε(k)u(w + b
∗
k)
≥ qk
∗
αε(k
∗)u(w + b∗k∗) + (1− q
k∗
αε(k
∗))u(0).
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Hence,
lim
ε→0
v(u, w,B, qk
∗
αε) = u(w + b
∗
k∗) > u(w),
which shows that for ε small enough, v(u, w,B, qk
∗
αε) > 0 and therefore V (u, w, α
ε, B) >
0.
Lemma A.6 Let u ∈ U0 and assume that B˜ is investment-prone. If u(0) = −∞,
then there exist w and an investment-prone set B that is feasible at w such that
V (u, w, α, B) = 0 for every always-uncertain α.
Proof. Since B˜ is investment-prone, for every k ∈ K there exists b′k such that
b′kk > 0. Let b
+ = mink b
′k
k > 0, and b
− = min(mink 6=j b
′k
j ,−1) < 0. The investment
bk given by bkk = b
+ and bkj = b
− for every j 6= k is such that for every j, bkj ≤ b
′k
j .
Since B˜ is comprehensive from Lemma A.3, it follows that bk ∈ B˜. Let B be the
investment-prone set B = {0K}∪{b
k, k ∈ K}. B is feasible at wealth-level w = −b−.
Let α be always uncertain and assume u(0) = −∞. For every s ∈ Sα and for every
bk ∈ B, the expected utility from investing in bk conditional on s is
∑
k′
qsα(k
′)u(w + bkk′) = q
s
α(k)u(w + b
+) + (1− qsα(k))u(w + b
−)
= qsα(k)u(w + b
+) + (1− qsα(k))u(0)
= −∞.
Thus, for every s ∈ Sα,
v(u, w,B, qsα) = u(w),
which implies that:
V (u, w, α, B) = 0.
Lemmata A.5 and A.6 provide the proof of Proposition A.4.
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Lemma A.7 If U = U∗, then the only class B˜ that satisfies NINI is the class B∗ of
belief-supported investment sets.
Proof. We need to show that the NINI investment set B˜ coincides with the set B∗
of belief-supported assets.
For any b ∈ B∗, and for any u ∈ U∗ and w such that b is feasible, u is concave
and increasing. This implies:
∑
k
p(k)u(w + bk) ≤ u(w +
∑
k
p(k)bk) ≤ u(w),
and hence, b ∈ B˜.
Now consider b ∈ B˜. Note that u given by u(z) = ln(z) for z > 0 is in U∗. Hence,
b ∈ B˜ implies that for every w large enough,
∑
k
p(k) ln(w + bk) ≤ ln(w),
which is equivalent to ∑
k
p(k) ln(1 +
bk
w
) ≤ 0.
Hence, for every ε > 0 small enough,
∑
k
p(k) ln(1 + εbk) ≤ 0.
A first-order Taylor expansion shows that this implies
∑
k
p(k)bk ≤ 0,
and hence, b ∈ B∗.
To wrap up the proof of Theorem 5, assume first that U and B satisfy NINI and
SCAI. Then from Lemma A.2, B is the class of investment sets contained in B˜. If B˜
is not investment-prone, then U = ∅, in which case B˜ = RK , a contradiction. Hence,
B˜ is investment-prone, and from Proposition A.4, U = U∗. Finally, it follows from
Lemma A.7 that B = B∗.
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We now show that U∗ and B∗ satisfy NINI and SCAI. With the assumption that
B = B∗, U∗ satisfies SCAI from Proposition A.4. With U = U∗, B∗ satisfies NINI
from Lemma A.7.
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